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THE POWER OF THE FCC TO REGULATE CABLE
PAY-TV: JURISDICTIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS
By MARK D. HOFFER*
I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was cre-
ated by the Communications Act of 1934,' a broadly based statute
superseding earlier, largely ineffective attempts to regulate
radio.' Under the terms of the Act, the FCC has the power to
regulate "broadcast services," 3 which in the 1930's principally
included radio. Broadcast television, when it arose in the 1940's,
was an obvious object of the Commission's power.' More recently,
* Law Clerk to the Hon. Harrison L. Winter, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit; B.A., Queens College of the City University of New York, 1973; J.D., Yale Law
School, 1976.
47 U.S.C. § 151-609 (1970).
The Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed by the Radio Act of 1927, ch.
169, § 39, 44 Stat. 1174), vested authority over broadcast frequencies in the hands of the
Secretary of Commerce. However, this authority was substantially weakened by subse-
quent judicial decisions. In Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923),
appeal dismissed per stipulation, 266 U.S. 636 (1924), the court held that the Secretary
lacked discretion to refuse to renew a broadcast license on the grounds of interference. In
United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Il. 1926), a district court held
that licencees were not bound by nonstatutory regulations and could operate on any
frequency despite the Secretary's order to the contrary. Following those decisions, the
Secretary abandoned all attempts to regulate, and the airspace became jammed with self-
styled radio operators who cared little about interference or national security needs. Jus-
tice Frankfurter summarized the chaotic situation when he remarked: "With everybody
on the air, nobody could be heard." National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 212 (1943). Congress thereafter decided upon a permanent regulatory agency with the
power to set conditions precedent for broadcasting, and to license only those operators who
met the requirements and could be accomodated within reasonable limits of interference.
The first was the Federal Radio Commission, created by the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169,
44 Stat. 1162 (repealed by the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat.
1102). It was succeeded 7 years later by the present Federal Communications Com-
mission. On the early history of broadcast regulation, see National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, supra at 210-13; W. EMERY, BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT: RESPONSIBILu-
TIES AND REGULATIONS 10-25 (1961).
See subchapter IIl of the Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-31 (1970).
' Broadcasting is defined by the statute as: "the dissemination of radio communica-
tions intended to be received by the public, directly or by the intermediary of relay
stations." 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1970). By way of clarification, "radio communications" are
further defined as:
the transmission by radio of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of
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the Commission has sought to exercise power over other new
forms of communication as they have become available.
The first of these was community antenna television, often
known as cable TV (CATV). Starting in the early 1950's, CATV
provided, for a fee, better reception of radio and television in
areas where the broadcast signal was weak.' The FCC began regu-
lating cable TV in 1965,6 largely for fear that its amplification of
distant signals would undercut local broadcasters.7 In United
all kinds, including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services
• . .incidental to such transmission.
Id. § 153(b). Television is clearly broadcasting because it relies on radio waves, specifically
the VHF portion of the electromagnetic wave spectrum-54-88 MHz and 174-220
MHz-which was allocated to broadcast television in 1951. Sixth Report and Order, 41
F.C.C. 148 (1951).
See S. REP. No. 923, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1959). Cable TV captures weak
broadcast signals through a master antenna, amplifies them, and distributes them to
individual homes over a network of coaxial wire. The technology of cable TV is more fully
defined in ON THE CABLE/THE TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE 11-23 (Sloan Comm'n 1971)
[hereinafter cited as SLOAN REPORT].
I Direct regulation of cable TV began with the First Report and Order on Microwave
Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, modified, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1 F.C.C.2d 524
(1965), aff'd sub nom. Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968),
approved, United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 659 n.17 (1972). A form
of indirect regulation had begun two years earlier, with the FCC controlling cable TV
through microwave carriers which served it. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32
F.C.C. 459 (1962), aff'd sub noma. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d
359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963) (denying the use of a microwave carrier
to a cable TV system which allegedly threatened local broadcasters). The nature and use
of microwave carriers is explained in note 7 infra.
I As an amplifying and distributing device, cable TV proved a boon to local broad-
casters. It provided a means whereby their audiences could be extended and maximized
beyond the range of the local broadcaster's transmitter. See, e.g., VHF Booster and Com-
munity Antenna Legislation: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, Pts. I & II, 86 Cong., 1st Sess., at 503 (1959) (statement of Harold Fellows,
Pres., National Ass'n of Broadcasters) [hereinafter cited as 1959 CATV Hearings]. This
satisfaction, however, was to be short lived. Cable TV gradually expanded its function as
a "master antenna" for local stations to include importing more distant TV signals for
the added enjoyment of its subscribers. This was done through the use of microwave
relays, high frequency transmission facilities used to relay messages from point to point
via common carrier. Local broadcasters began to complain that CATV with unchecked
powers of importation would hamper their financial stability (by fractionalizing audiences
and revenues, and by program duplication). See, e.g., 1959 CATV Hearings, at 380-86
(statement of Frank Reardon, KGEZ-TV, Kalispell, Mont.), 501-18 (statement of Harold
Fellows, Pres., National Ass'n of Broadcasters); Regulation of CA TV: Hearings before the
Communications and Power Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on H.R. 7715, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. at 317-53 (1965) (statement of Vincent T.
Wasilewski, Pres., National Ass'n of Broadcasters), 355-78 (statement of Lester W. Lin-
dow, Executive Director, Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as 1965
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States v. Southwestern Cable Co.' and again in United States v.
Midwest Video Corp.,' the Supreme Court sustained the FCC's
exercise of jurisdiction over cable TV.
The next development in the 1950's was broadcast pay televi-
sion, also known as subscription television."0 Subscription TV
used conventional broadcast signals to provide a wider range of
programs than network television." The FCC began regulating
CA TV HearingsI, Regulation of CA TV: Hearings before the Communications and Power
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 12914, H.R.
13286, and H.R. 14201, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 352-73 (1966) (statement of Vincent T.
Wasilewski, Pres., National Ass'n of Broadcasters), 373-425 (statement of Lester W. Lin-
dow, Executive Director, Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.); Regulation of CATV:
Hearings before the Communications and Power Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 10268, H.R. 10510, H. Con. Res. 87, and H.
Con. Res. 2a5, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. at 287-313 (1969) (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
General Counsel, National Ass'n of Broadcasters) [hereinafter cited as 1969 CATV
Hearings]; First Report and Order on Microwave Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 688-91,
modified, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 1 F.C.C.2d 524 (1965), aff'd sub nom. Black
Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968), approved, United States v. Midwest
Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 659 n.17; CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403, 413-
14 (1959).
- 392 U.S. 157 (1968), revg Southwestern Cable Co. v. United States, 378 F.2d 118
(9th Cir. 1967).
, 406 U.S. 649 (1972), rev'g Midwest Video Corp. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th
Cir. 1971).
10 In 1955, two pay-TV proponents, Zenith Radio Corp. and Teco, Inc., convinced the
FCC to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 Fed. Reg. 988 (1955), inviting com-
ments as to whether authorization of subscription television (STV) would be in the public
interest. Because of Congressional pressure, the first STV station was not authorized until
1961. Hartford Phonevision Co., 30 F.C.C. 301 (1961), aff'd sub nom. Connecticut Comm.
Against Pay TV v. FCC, 301 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 816 (1962). A
complete review of interim developments is provided in National Ass'n of Theatre Owners
v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 195-97 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
1 Contract rights to first run movies, athletic events, and cultural presentations are
purchased by the entrepreneur. These are broadcast on a conventional TV channel, using
conventional TV equipment, with the exception that the aural and visual signals are
purposely distorted. In order to rectify the image and receive these programs (which are
not available on network TV), subscribers lease special decoding devices at established
rates. See R. BLOCK, OVER THE AIR PAY-TV: FOR WHOM WILL IT PAY? 6-8 (1974); R. ADLER
& S. BAER, THE ELECTRONIC Box OFFICE: HUMANMES AND ARTS ON THE CABLE 42 (1974).
Following FCC authorization of STV in 1961, supra note 10, three systems became opera-
tional in Hartford, Toronto, and Los Angeles/San Francisco. All three failed due to lack
of viewer support. See Blank, The Quest for Quantity and Diversity in Television
Programming, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 448, 451-54 (1966). General interest in STV has declined,
although additional authorizations have been sought and granted. Blonder-Tongue Broad-
casting Corp., 25 P. & F. RADIO REG. 2d 104 (1972); B & F Broadcasting, Inc., 28 P. & F.
RADIO REG. 2d 414 (1973). See also Paul Kagan Pay-TV Newsletter, June 11, 1974 at 2
(describing plans for financing new STV systems).
1976
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subscription TV in 1968, under pressure this time from theater
owners who feared loss of their audiences."2 This jurisdiction was
upheld in National Association of Theatre Owners v. FCC.'3
The most recent development is cablecast pay television, or
cable pay-TV. Introduced in 1972,'1 cable pay-TV provides the
same service as subscription TV-programs for a fee-but uses
cable rather than broadcast transmission.' The FCC had antici-
pated cable pay-TV by 1970, and has imposed regulation since
that time." Cable pay-TV is of special concern to the national
broadcast networks. Unlike cable television proper, it does far
more than merely amplify weak signals. Unlike subscription TV,
it does not rely on conventional broadcast TV equipment, and is
therefore not affected by the limited capacity of the air to carry
broadcasts without minimal interference. 7
2 Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466 (1968), aff'd sub nom. National Ass'n
of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
Literature on the regulation of subscription television includes: Brown, The Subscription
Television Controversy: A Continuing Symptom of Federal Communications Commission
Ills, 24 FED. COMM. B.J. 259 (1971); Comment, Subscription Television, the FCC, and the
Courts, 15 ST. Louis L.J. 283 (1970).
,3 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
' Cable pay-TV was first introduced at the 1972 National Cable Television Associa-
tion Convention. Broadcasting, May 22, 1972, at 21-22. The first systems went into com-
mercial operation in early 1973. Paul Kagan Pay-TV Newsletter, Feb. 8, 1973, at 1.
"s An agreement is reached between the pay-TV entrepreneur and a cable television
operator for the use of vacant channels on the latter's system. In exchange for a stated
percentage of future gross revenue, the entrepreneur is granted the right to transmit
material which he has personally selected, purchased, and edited. Subscribers to the cable
pay-TV are drawn from the pool of individuals already connected to the "parent" cable
television system. They pay fees on a per-program or per-channel basis and are also leased
special decoding devices to receive the transmission clearly. The technology of cable pay-
TV is set out in detail in R. ADLER & S. BAER, supra note 11, at 30-46; Pay Cable: An
Industry Overview 2-10 (National Cable Television Ass'n 1974). A sample channel lease
agreement can be found in A.B.A./A.L.I., LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION AND OPERA-
TION OF PAY TELEVISION SYSTEMS AND LEASED CABLE TELEVISION CHANNELS 369 (1974).
Cable pay-TV has grown into an industry which encompasses 43 cable television
systems, 60,000 households, and 11 states. NCTA, Subscription Cablecasting Fact Sheet
(Apr. 1974) at 1 [hereinafter cited as Fact Sheet].
11 Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 825 (1970). The literature on regula-
tion of cable pay-TV includes Pearson, Cable: The Thread by Which Television Competi-
tion Hangs, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 800, 818-22 (1974); Comment, Regulation of Pay-Cable
and Closed Circuit Movies: No Room in the Wasteland, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 600 (1973).
11 Television has been relegated to the VHF portion of the electromagnetic spectrum,
supra note 4, which allows for 12 clear channels, given a stipulated bandwidth of 6 MHz
each. No one locality has all 12 channels in use because of interference problems. New
York City and Los Angeles are the national leaders, each having 6 television channels by
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The greater flexibility of cable pay-TV (it can deliver almost
any program the public will pay to see and hear) virtually assures
its power to compete effectively with other forms of communica-
tion for audiences and profits. The networks have argued that
cable pay-TV will eventually divert not only their viewers and
advertising dollars, but their programming as well. They have
argued cable pay-TV will be able in the end to "siphon off" (i.e.,
bid away) the most popular shows currently shown on network
television. 8 The FCC responded to these complaints by promul-
gating a set of regulations-known as "anti-siphoning"
rules- restricting the program content of cable pay-TV. 9
This article argues first that under the Communications Act
of 1934 the FCC lacks power over cable pay-TV, and second that,
were such a power granted by Congress, the application of the
"anti-siphoning" rules to cable pay-TV violates the first amend-
ment.
FCC allocation. 47 C.F.R. § 73.606 (1975). The FCC has attempted to alleviate the over-
crowding of VHF by opening up the more numerous UHF frequencies for television use.
However, because of technical drawbacks, financial woes, and administrative bungling,
UHF television is still more myth than reality. See Webbink, The Impact of UHF Promo-
tion: The All-Channel Television Receiver Law, 34 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 535 (1969).
1" Broadcasters estimate that cable pay-TV could, if left unchecked, derive sufficient
bargaining power to force exclusive rights to new motion pictures, merely by attracting 2
percent of the current TV households in the United States. N.A.B. Fact Sheet: Economic
Effects of Siphoning 6 (1974). But see R. NoLL, M. PECK, & J. McGowAN, ECONOMIC
ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 297 (1973). More detailed analysis on the ability of
cable pay-TV to outbid network TV is found in First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 9-
10, reconsideration denied, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 797 (1975).
Similar rhetoric was used by the television networks to oppose broadcast pay-TV when it
first emerged. See Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466, 500 (1968).
" The rules were adopted in Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 825
(1970), and codified in 47 C.F.R. § 76.225 (1975). They were patterned after similar rules
which had been previously adopted for subscription television. Fourth Report and Order,
15 F.C.C.2d 466 (1968), as codified in 47 C.F.R. § 73.643 (1975).
The FCC has recently reviewed the anti-siphoning rules for both broadcast and cable
pay-TV and found them basically satisfactory, subject to some changes in detail. See First
Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, reconsideration denied, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 797 (1975) (rules on movies, sports, and series amended; jurisdiction
reaffirmed); Second Report and Order, 40 Fed. Reg. 52731 (1975) (series rule deleted). The
thrust of this article is limited, as the text indicates, to anti-siphoning rules as they relate
to cable pay-TV.
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II. THE POWER OF THE FCC OVER CABLE PAY-TV UNDER THE
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934
A. The Text of the Act
In support of its rules governing cable pay-TV, the FCC has
claimed a general power over all broadcast and wire communica-
tions under the 1934 Act. The Supreme Court, in dictum, has
acquiesced in this view. But analysis of the Act itself reveals no
such power.
The provision on which the FCC relies for its assertion of
broad power is section 2(a) of the Act:
(a) The provisions of this chapter shall apply to all interstate
and foreign communication by wire or radio and all interstate and
foreign transmission of energy by radio, which originates and/or is
received within the United States, and to all persons engaged within
the United States in such communication or such transmission of
energy by radio, and to the licensing and regulating of all radio
stations as hereinafter provided; but it shall not apply to persons
engaged in wire or radio communication or transmission in the
Canal Zone, or to wire or radio communication or transmission
wholly within the Canal Zone."
But the words: "The provisions of this chapter shall apply to all
interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio," do not
constitute a grant of power. Congress could easily have written:
"The power of the Commission shall extend . .," but it did not.
Section 2(a) does not establish the extent of the FCC's power, but
describes an area within which that power shall operate; it does
nothing more than allude to other provisions in the Act, which are
themselves grants of power. 2'
If we read section 2(a) as a grant of power in itself, that power
must apply to all persons "engaged in such communication" as
well as to all communication. And if that power is held by the
FCC independently of other provisions of the Act, it is hard to see
where its boundaries are. Would it extend to the homes or fami-
lies of the affected "persons"? The more difficult the answer to
0 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1970).
" See First Report and Order on Microwave Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 753 (Loe-
vinger, Comm'r, dissenting), modified, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1 F.C.C.2d 524
(1965), aff'd sub nom. Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968),
approved, United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 659 n.17 (1972).
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such questions, the more likely that section 2(a) describes persons
subject to specific powers granted elsewhere in the Act.
Other provisions of the 1934 Act, taken individually and to-
gether, confirm that section 2(a) is not a grant of full power to
the FCC. Section 4 contains an enumeration of the general powers
of the Commission; 22 subchapter II grants to the Commission spe-
cific powers over common carriers;23 subchapter III contains an
entire section enumerating the Commission's specific powers over
radio communications. 24 If section 2(a) were a grant of power over
all wire and broadcast communications, these enumerations of
specific (and more limited) powers would be surplusage. The pur-
pose of section 2(a), placed near the beginning of the Act and
couched in general terms, is to establish a framework for the Act
and to ground it squarely within the power of Congress to regulate
commerce. 25 To see in such broad language a specific grant of
power would be akin to deriving a "general welfare" power from
the preamble of the Constitution.
If section 2(a) is not a grant of power, the Commission's
claim of jurisdiction over cable pay-TV must rest on some other
provision of the Act, and no other provision supports such a
claim. The powers granted to the Commission are distributed
over two subchapters, one relating to "common carriers" and the
other to "broadcast communications." Cable pay-TV falls into
neither category.2 1 The specific powers in section 303 of the Act,
47 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
23 Id. §§ 201-23.
Id. §§ 301-30.
Indeed, the Act states that
nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to give the Commission
jurisdiction with respect to . . . intrastate communication service by wire or
radio ....
Id. § 152(b). See also S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934) (stating that the
purpose of the section was, among others, to delineate federal and state jurisdiction over
communications).
" Broadcasting is defined in note 4 supra. Cable pay-TV is clearly not broadcasting
because it does not rely on transmission via radio waves. See note 15 supra.
Common carriers are defined as:
any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio or in interstate or foreign radio transmission
of energy . . . but a person engaged in broadcasting shall not, insofar as such
person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.
47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1970). This section sheds little light on the nature of common carriers
and recourse must be had to additional FCC materials. These indicate that an archetypal
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
governing broadcast communications, 7 while they might fairly be
construed to extend beyond the narrowest definition of "broad-
cast" communications to embrace various auxiliary services, do
not reach so far as to cover a mode of communication entirely
different in nature from broadcast television.
In Southwestern Cable," the Supreme Court rejected this
line of argument.
We cannot construe the Act so restrictively. Nothing in the
language of [section 2(a)], in the surrounding language, or in the
Act's history or purposes limits the Commission's authority to those
activities and forms of communication that are specifically de-
scribed by the Act's other provisions.2
The Court relied for its position almost entirely on a few brief
excerpts, taken largely out of context, from the legislative history
of the 1934 Act. One particular excerpt was invoked by the Court
to establish that the Commission was vested with "broad author-
ity" over communications.0 However, that two-word quotation is
from the President's message to Congress in support of the bill."
Presidents do not always get what they ask for, and their pro-
nouncements are not the will of Congress. Further, the sentence
in which the words "broad authority" occurs is the following: "In
the field of communications, however, there is no single govern-
ment agency charged with broad authority. 3 2 It is hard to infer
a grant of power by Congress from this sentence. Finally, Roose-
wlt's message specifically proposed that the new Commission be
vested only with such powers as were already distributed among
existing agencies.3 3 The history of the Act in fact cuts rather
strongly against the position taken by the Court.
common carrier must possess four characteristics: (1) Interstate operations; (2) the offer-
ing of a "communications service"; (3) to the public; (4) "for hire." FCC, Memorandum
on Jurisdiction, reprinted in 1965 CATV Hearings, supra note 7, at 104, 15. Cable pay-
TV is not a "communications service"-a mere vehicle over which messages selected by
the consumer may be carried (such as telephone or telegraph service). Cable pay-TV
messages (i.e., actual cable pay-TV programming), though responsive to consumer tastes,
are under the control of the entrepreneur.
-7 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970).
" United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), rev'g Southwestern
Cable Co. v. United States, 378 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1967).
"Id. at 172.
0 H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934), cited id. at 168.
' The text of the address appeared originally in 78 Cong. Rec. 3181 (1934).
32 Id.
11 The address continued by stating:
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The committee reports from both Houses indicate that sec-
tion 2 of the Act is designed to settle the respective spheres of
power between the Federal Government and the states, not to
make a specific grant of power to the FCC; 4 and indicate that the
Act as a whole grants no new powers to the Federal Government,
but only consolidates existing jurisdiction within a single new
agency." In any event, the Court's endorsement in Southwestern
Cable of a broad FCC power over wire communications was en-
tirely by way of dictum, as the majority opinion was quick to
point out:
There is no need here to determine in detail the limits of the Com-
mission's authority to regulate CATV.... We express no views as
to the Commission's authority, if any, to regulate CATV under any
other circumstances or for any other purposes."
The holding itself in Southwestern Cable-that a specific exercise
of power over CATV by the FCC was legitimate37-was based
entirely on a theory of "ancillary jurisdiction. ' 3 In a sole
I recommend that the Congress create a new agency to be known as the
"Federal Communications Commission," such agency to be vested with the
authority now lying in the Federal Radio Commission and with such author-
ity over communications as now lies with the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion-...
It is my thought that a new commission such as I suggest might well be
organized this year by transferring the present authority for the control of
communications of the Radio Commission and the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
Id. These remarks have always been construed as advocating an FCC geared solely to the
concerns of its predecessor agencies. See, e.g., Hearings before the Senate Comm. on
Interstate Commerce on S. 2910, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. at 48 (1934) (testimony of Henry A.
Bellows, National Ass'n of Broadcasters), 106 (testimony of David Sarnoff, R.C.A.);
Hearings before the House Comm. on Interstate Commerce on H.R. 8301, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. at 105 (1934) (testimony of Henry A. Bellows, National Ass'n of Broadcasters).
'4 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
" See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934); S. REI. No. 781, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934); 78 Cong. Rec. 10312-13 (1934) (statement of Rep. S. Rayburn,
Chmn., House Comm. on Interstate Commerce).
" 392 U.S. at 178.
31 In response to the fears of broadcasters over signal importation by cable television
(see note 7 supra), the FCC imposed rules which prohibited CATV from importing any
distant signal into the nation's top 100 markets, absent a showing of public interest. 47
C.F.R. § 7 4 .1107(a) (1972). The rules have since been modified by the Cable Television
Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, reconsideration denied, 36 F.C.C.2d 326 (1972). See
47 C.F.R. §§ 76.61, 76.63 (1975).
11 392 U.S. at 178. Ancillary jurisdiction is discussed at text accompanying notes 44-
50 infra.
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concurrence, Mr. Justice White disagreed with the reading of
section 2(a) offered by the majority, and took a position close to
the one advanced in this article:
Section 2(a) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 152(a), says
that "[tihe provisions of this chapter shall apply to all interstate
and foreign communication by wire or radio .... ." I am inclined
to believe that this section means that the Commission must gener-
ally base jurisdiction on other provisions of the Act."
In United States v. Midwest Video Corp.,'0 decided three
years after Southwestern Cable, the Court again recognized a
broad grant of power in section 2(a) of the Act, but erroneously
characterized the dictum of Southwestern Cable as a holding:
We also held that § 2(a) is itself a grant of regulatory power and not
merely a prescription of the forms of communication to which the
Act's other provisions . . . apply."
Once again, however, the Court relied on the theory of "ancillary
jurisdiction" to decide the case.4"
After Midwest Video, the state of the case law on FCC juris-
diction is far from clear. Only four Justices, including Mr. Justice
White, joined in the plurality opinion in Midwest; Mr. Chief
Justice Burger concurred in the result, but questioned the broad
jurisdiction granted to the FCC;4 3 and four Justices dissented.
Thus, despite the assertions found in these cases, it cannot be
said that the Supreme Court has squarely held section 2(a) of the
Act to be a grant of power broad enough to include jurisdiction
over cable pay-TV. Indeed, if the power of the FCC were as great
as is suggested in dictum, the theory of "ancillary jurisdiction,"
on which the Court actually relied in Southwestern Cable and
Midwest Video, would be unnecessary.
1, 392 U.S. at 181.
10 406 U.S. 649 (1972), rev 'g Midwest Video Corp. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th
Cir. 1971).
" Id. at 660.
, Id. at 662-63.
, Chief Justice Burger remarked:
Candor requires acknowledgement, for me at least, that the Commission's
position strains the outer limits of even the open-ended and pervasive juris-
diction that has evolved by decisions of the Commission and the courts.
Id. at 676.
VOL. 53
FCC REGULATION OF CABLE PAY-TV
B. Ancillary Jurisdiction
Under the doctrine of "ancillary jurisdiction," the FCC may
regulate any form of communication which is "reasonably re-
lated" to broadcasting, since power over "broadcast communica-
tions" is specifically granted in section 303 of the Act." The Com-
mission has justified its proposed regulation of cable pay-TV by
alleging a threat of "siphoning" and attendant injury to regular
broadcast television.4" Although the Supreme Court has twice
upheld FCC regulation of cable television proper (CATV) under
the doctrine of "ancillarity,"46 it has yet to speak on the matter
of cable pay-TV.
"Ancillarity" is a compelling argument in favor of the Com-
mission's power over CATV; were it rejected, the FCC's statutory
jurisdiction over "broadcast" communication might be largely
frustrated. But the argument has little force with respect to cable
pay-TV. The jurisdiction over CATV upheld in Southwestern
Cable and Midwest Video was over a medium which is strictly
auxiliary to broadcast television." As used in CATV, the cable is
in essence a long antenna provided to viewers who otherwise re-
ceive a weak signal from the broadcast networks." Since the dis-
tribution of broadcast signals is clearly the subject of FCC con-
trol, the Court's decisions are eminently reasonable.49 But in
47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970).
" See First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 44-45, reconsideration denied, Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 797 (1975).
' See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972); United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
1 The explicit concern of Southwestern Cable is described in note 37 supra. Midwest
Video dealt with proposed rules that would require cable television systems to cablecast
programs of local interest. See Second Report and Order on Microwave Served CATV, 2
F.C.C.2d 725, stay denied, 3 F.C.C.2d 816 (1966), reconsideration denied, 6 F.C.C.2d 309
(1967), aff'd sub nor. Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968), codified
as 47 C.F.R. § 76.201 (1973). The rules have since been rescinded. Report and Order, 49
F.C.C.2d 1090 (1974).
' See note 5 supra.
" Put another way, by carrying TV signals along the cable, CATV indirectly gains
through the exploitation of a resource that is subject to FCC control. As a trade-off, the
courts have expressly imposed a degree of federal regulation:
CATV systems receive the signals of television broadcast stations, amplify
them, transmit them by microwave or cable, and ultimately distribute them.
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161 (1968).
The use of broadcast signals has enabled CATV to finance the construction
of high capacity cable facilities.
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 656 (1972).
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cable pay-TV the cable is used as a self-contained form of com-
munication; it is a channel for selling entertainment entirely sep-
arate from broadcast television. 0 An entrepreneur could set up a
cable and sell anything from recorded French lessons to reruns of
children's shows without encroaching in the slightest on the air
waves. This activity would be no more "auxiliary" to broadcast
television than that of a mail-order book company. It is true that
cable pay-TV can compete with broadcast television for audi-
ences and ideas. But so can the stage, live sporting events, or even
phonograph records. The point is too broad to serve as an argu-
ment for FCC jurisdiction."
C. Plenary Rulemaking Powers
A third theory of jurisdiction over cable pay-TV advanced by
the FCC rests on the broad rulemaking powers granted in the
Communications Act. The most sweeping of these, section 4(i), 2
confers on the Commission power to make rules "necessary" to
the exercise of its power over communications. 3 The Commission
Those who exploit the existing broadcast signals for private commercial
surface transmission by CATV-to which they make no contribution-are
not exactly strangers to the stream of broadcasting. The essence of the mat-
ter is that when they interrupt the signal and put it to their own use for
profit, they take on burdens, one of which is regulation by the Commission.
Id. at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis supplied).
" See note 15 supra.
The FCC has, in any event, a general duty to promote competition within the
broadcast industry, and not to engage in economic protectionism. See, e.g., Communica-
tions Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 304, 307(b), 307(d), 309(h), 312 (1970); United States
v. Radio Corp. of America, Inc., 358 U.S. 346, 351 (1958); National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 340 U.S.
470, 474-75 (1940); Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359, 362 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 193 F.2d
230, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 414 (1952); Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180
F.2d 28, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Hyde, The Role of Competition & Monopoly in the Communi-
cations Industry, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 899, 900 (1968); Johnson & Hoak, Media
Concentration: Some Observations on the United States' Experience, 56 IA. L. REV. 267,
290-91 (1970). Cf. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 97 F.2d 641, 643 (1938).
52 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1970).
Specifically, the section states that:
The Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules and regula-
tions, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be
necessary in the execution of its functions.
Id. A similar provision is:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the Commission from time to
time, as public convenience, interest or necessity requires, shall . . . (r)
[miake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and con-
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claims the power under these provisions over almost any person
or organization identified as a threat to a statutory policy, 4 and
justifies applying anti-siphoning rules to cable pay-TV by assert-
ing a policy which favors maintenance of flourishing and diverse
broadcast television. 5
Except in its attempt to rely on more specific support in the
rulemaking provisions of the Act itself, this argument is virtually
the same as the one advanced for "ancillary jurisdiction," and
fails in the same manner when applied to cable pay-TV. The
rulemaking powers granted to the Commission are couched in
narrow terms and are in support of other powers;5" they cannot
in themselves be read as a source of sweeping control over all
communications.
57
ditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this chapter ....
Id. § 303(r).
The expression of this theory itself can be seen in the regulation of cable television
proper. See, e.g., Second Report and Order on Microwave Served CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725,
727-29, 734, 794-97, stay denied, 3 F.C.C.2d 816 (1966), reconsideration denied, 6 F.C.C.2d
309 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968).
But see CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403, 429 (1959).
The attitude that this theory of jurisdiction extends to any and all persons or organi-
zations is evident in Second Report and Order, supra at 730.
The FCC has a major responsibility under subchapter III of the Act. It is "the
obligation to provide a widely dispersed radio and television service" with a "fair, effi-
cient, and equitable distribution" of service among "the several states and communities."
S. REP. No. 923, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1959); 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1970). Because of
the threat of siphoning, cable pay-TV is seen as undermining the continued vitality of
broadcast TV service, hence the Commission's overall responsibility under subchapter III
of the Act. See First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 44-45, reconsideration denied,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 797 (1975) (stressing the "continuing
economic vitality of free television," enhancing "the integrity of broadcast signals" and
the obligation to "make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States,
a rapid, efficient, nationwide wire and radio communications service" (citations omit-
ted)).
' Both rulemaking clauses use such phraseology as "not inconsistent with this chap-
ter"; "not inconsistent with law"; "as may be necessary in execution of the Commission's
functions"; and "as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter." Such
language, especially the last two excerpts, mark the rulemaking grants as mere technical
tools to enforce jurisdiction vested elsewhere in the statute. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 303(r)
(1970).
11 The sweep of the rulemaking clauses, if construed to be jurisdictional grants, is
virtually boundless:
The principal argument urged in support of the Commission's jurisdiction
[over such cable television companies] is that it is desirable for the FCC to
have such jurisdiction in order to attain the general objectives of the Com-
munications Act. However, if this reasoning is sound, then the jurisdiction
1976
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III. CABLE PAY-TV AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
It is settled law that the protections of freedom of speech and
of the press in the first amendment" extend to radio and televi-
sion. 9 Anti-siphoning regulations are clearly abridgements of the
broadcasters' power to speak unrestrainedly.0 But because of the
special nature of the broadcast medium, the Supreme Court has
also countenanced certain constraints on the form and content of
broadcast communications as necessary incidents of FCC regula-
tion. The interest of the public in efficient and varied use of the
air waves has been held to justify some limitation on the net-
works' power to broadcast whatever they want. In this area the
Court has engaged in a classical balancing, "a candid and in-
formed weighing of competing interests."'"
of the Commission is literally unlimited. There is scarcely any aspect of
organized social living that is not in some way related to the complex ramifi-
cations of the communications system . . . .Such a vague and broad reason-
ing simply will not sustain jurisdiction as to activities not plainly within
more specific statutory language.
1965 CA TV Hearings, supra note 7, at 36 (statement of L. Loevinger, FCC Commissioner).
', The first amendment to the Constitution reads in appropriate part that "Congress
shall make no law .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. ... U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
1' Section 326 of the Communications Act specifically enjoins the FCC from engaging
in censorship. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970). Appellate courts have also repeatedly stressed that
the guarantees of the first amendment are as applicable to radio and television as they
are to any other mode of expression. See, e.g., Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of
Educ., 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("the First Amendment draws
no distinction between the various methods of communicating ideas."); Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 895 (3d Cir. 1969), aff'd, 403 U.S. 29 (1971) ("no rational
distinction can be made between radio and television on the one hand and the press on
the other in affording the constitutional protection contemplated by the First Amend-
ment."); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (first amendment
rights apply to any "significant medium for the communication of ideas."); United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) ("We have no doubt that moving
pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed
by the First Amendment."). However, the reach of those guarantees may well differ
between the various media. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
388 (1969); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952); Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290, 307 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 79 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
See 47 C.F.R. § 76.225 (1975).
, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring),
rehearing denied, 342 U.S. 842 (1951), rehearing denied, 355 U.S. 936 (1958). The nature
of the balancing test is defined, and a list of significant opinions included in T. EMERSON,
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 48-58 (1967). In the telecommuni-
cations field, the balancing test is exemplified by three recent decisions. In Red Lion
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Under the established law of the first amendment, both
within and without the area of communications, the FCC's anti-
siphoning rules cannot be applied to cable pay-TV. The interests
entering into the "balance" are entirely different from those relat-
ing to broadcast or cablecast network television, and the estab-
lished first amendment "balancing" yields a different result.
A. Preservation of a Scarce Resource
The most important element entering into the balance in the
case of conventional broadcast is "spectrum scarcity."62 If the
"ether" or channel airspace used by radio and television is indeed
a precious and limited natural resource," the allocation of this
scarce resource to broadcasters can plausibly be accompanied by
such regulation as the public interest demands.6" In such situa-
tions, the regulation of speech may be necessary to preserve the
possibility of any speech at all. If four tried to speak at once in a
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Court upheld the Commission's fairness
doctrine rules against a first amendment challenge. While conceding that the broadcast
licensee has the private right to speak as he chooses under the constitutional mandate (id.
at 389-90), the majority nonetheless concluded that the public's right to hear a full pano-
ply of political commentary was stronger. "It is the right of the viewers and the listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Id. at 390.
In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973), the Court rejected the contention that public groups are guaranteed some form of
access to radio and television. A test of balancing was invoked (id. at 102), but the
majority concluded that the first amendment prevailed over the need for such a guarantee.
Id. at 120-21.
Finally, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), the Court upheld
the right of a broadcasting company to telecast a rape victim's name, obtained from
records open to public inspection. The Court concluded that "political institutions must
weigh the interests in privacy with the interests of the public to know and of the press to
publish" (id. at 496), and that the material in contention "contains none of the indicia of
those limited categories of expression . . . of such slight social value . . . that any benefit
to be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
Id. at 495.
See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943):
Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the limited facili-
ties of radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio is inherently not avail-
able to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other
modes of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation. Because it
cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it must be denied.
Id. at 226.
" See note 17 supra.
" See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 638 (1965); T. EMER-
SON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 663 (1970); National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-16 (1943); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470, 474 (1940).
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town square which could only hold three, no one could be heard
at all unless the town moved in to prevent a brawl. An extension
of this principle is the Commission's "Fairness" doctrine, the
requirement that interested parties be invited to answer the net-
works' contentions on certain matters, 5 which the Supreme Court
upheld in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC"6 against a first
amendment challenge. The Court squarely placed the public's
access to a full range of views above the broadcaster's unfettered
right to speak. "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."67
The "scarce resource" analysis does not support the applica-
tion of anti-siphoning rules to cable pay-TV. The cable does not
use broadcast frequencies. Where cable pay-TV is concerned,
there is no scarcity of the power to communicate. 9 The public can
receive over the cable as many programs as it will pay to see and
hear. In this respect, cable pay-TV is no different from the daily
press. There is potentially a town square for each speaker.70
I The fairness doctrine consists of two distinct obligations: (1) The duty to broadcast
all sides of significant public issues; and (2) the duty of broadcasters to provide a right of
reply when individuals or groups have been attacked over their facilities. The first obliga-
tion is codified in 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970). The latter is contained in 47 C.F.R. § 73.123
(1975).
" 395 U.S. 367 (1969), rev'g Radio & Television News Directors Ass'n v. United
States, 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968).
11 Id. at 390. The court expressly relied upon notions of "spectrum scarcity" in reach-
ing its conclusion. Id.
" Cable television does not use broadcast signals except to the extent that its primary
purpose is the amplification and distribution of weak signals already in the air. See note
5 supra.
" Cable pay-TV, in contrast to its parent cable system, has no contact with broadcast
frequencies whatever. The corpus of its transmissions consists of material selected, pur-
chased, and edited by the individual entrepreneur. See note 15 supra. Further, cable pay-
TV does not become engaged in a "scarcity" question by virtue of its occupying a channel
on a cable television system. Cable television systems in the current state of the art may
carry up to 40 channels. See SLoA REPORT, supra note 5, at 2. Indeed, FCC regulations
require all CATV systems within the top 100 TV markets to carry a minimum of 20. 47
C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(1) (1975). In contrast to the crowded radio spectrum, there is ample
room for many voices catering to many tastes.
1* The Justice Department, for example, has argued this position before the FCC
repeatedly, stating that cable pay-TV entrepreneurs are "businessmen engaged in a busi-
ness, cablecasting, into which any number of others may enter." Comments of the Justice
Dep't, F.C.C. Docket 19954, Nov. 1, 1972, at 10. Proponents of cable pay-TV (arguing for
less restrictive, or no regulation) have likewise rebutted the notion of "spectrum scarcity."
See, e.g., Comments of Optical Systems Corp., F.C.C. Docket 19554, Sep. 20, 1974, at 43
[hereinafter cited as Optical Comments]. See also First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d
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B. Other Interests To Be Weighed
The arguments which balance other interests against the
freedom of speech of the broadcasters fundamentally resemble
the "scarce resource" analysis in that they rely on the special
nature of the broadcast medium. Again, the difference between
cable pay-TV and broadcast communication blunts the force of
these arguments as applied to the former.
1. Public Domain or Ownership
Courts have upheld FCC regulations limiting the freedom of
broadcasters on the ground that the channel airspace is "owned"
by the public." Broadcasters are treated as trustees of the prop-
erty.72 Analogies are commonly drawn from constitutional deci-
sions in which the inherent "public character" of property is held
to survive its private use.7"
The "public domain" theory is inapplicable to cable pay-TV.
Cables used in transmitting entertainment for a fee have no in-
herent "public" character. There is no reason they cannot be
owned and operated by those who build them. To be sure, the
cable owners and builders must generally obtain some form of
public authorization to use streets, ducts, and rights of way rout-
ing the cables." This is at best an argument for allowing states
and localities, not the FCC, to impose limitations on cable pay-
1, 74 n.6, reconsideration denied, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 797
(1975) (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (questioning appli-
cation of scarcity rationale to cable pay-TV).
1' See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 205-07 (1963); In re Business
Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242, 254-55 (1970) (Johnson, Comm'r,
dissenting), rev'd, Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642
(D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); EMERSON, supra note 64, at 660-61; Johnson & Westen, A Twentieth Centur%
Soapbox: The Right to Purchase Radio and Television Time, 57 U. VA. L. REv. 574, 591
(1971); Robinson, The F.C.C. and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of
Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67, 151 (1967); Note, Regulation of
Program Content by the F.C.C., 77 HARV. L. REv. 701, 713 (1964).
See, e.g., FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1971); Food Emp.
Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946). But see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
1' See, e.g., Section 362, Charter of the City of New York (Rev. 1972), which empowers
the Board of Estimate to grant franchises for the use of city streets, pipes, and conduits
"for the transmission of electricity . ..heat or power." Id.
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TV."h And the argument sweeps too broadly: It would justify gov-
ernment control over all forms of communication that use such
public places as streets, sidewalks, and parks.78 The courts have
never gone so far."
2. Rights/Privileges Doctrine
Closely related to the notion of "public ownership" is the
theory that "those who obtain a license are granted a privilege
. . . therefore . . . a licensee, exercising such a privilege, must
abide by Commission imposed rules."7 In sum, a distinction is
drawn between a naturally vested right, and a privilege benevo-
lently granted by government. The triennial licensing of radio
and television79 is held to fall in the latter category, and the gener-
osity of the state is held to be a fair exchange for a heavier degree
of regulation. 0
Commentators have rejected the idea of a rights/privileges
dichotomy as "little more than a legalism."'" Furthermore, the
11 States and localities are currently precluded from regulation of cable pay-TV. See
Interpretive Ruling, 31 F.C.C.2d 747 (1971); Cable Television Report and Order, 36
F.C.C.2d 143, 193, reconsideration denied, 36 F.C.C.2d 326 (1972). This ruling has evoked
much dissatisfaction from the states and localities, probably because they view cable pay-
TV as a source of much needed revenue (through the imposition of franchise fees). See,
e.g., Broadcasting, May 20, 1974, at 57-58; July 1, 1974, at 39.
7' Radio & Television News Directors Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002, 1019 (7th
Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nom. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969);
Robinson, supra note 71, at 152-53.
" See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Edwards
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko
v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (all cases recognizing the public's constitutional right to use
streets and parks in the exercise of first amendment freedoms).
n Radio & Television News Directors Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002, 1019 (7th
Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nom. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See
also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969); Television Corp. of
Michigan v. FCC, 294 F.2d 730, 733-34 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
", The FCC is statutorily empowered to grant and renew all broadcast licenses. 47
U.S.C. §§ 307(a), (d) (1970). Renewals are currently on a three year basis. 47 C.F.R. §
73.630(a) (1975).
" Put quite simply, the rationale is that since no one has a right to a broadcast
frequency (the frequency spectrum constituting scarce, publicly held property), the state
could scrutinize the circumstances under which a privilege to broadcast was granted, even
to the extent of compromising constitutional rights.
11 Note, supra note 71, at 713. For a full discussion of how the doctrine arose, and its
current status, see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 H~Av. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
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Supreme Court has proven unreceptive to the notion that govern-
ment may extract the surrender of constitutional liberties in re-
turn for some form of subsidy.2 Objections directed at the doc-
trine's application to cable pay-TV are even clearer. The whole
underpinning of "privilege" rests upon our earlier assumption
that broadcast frequencies are few and far between, 3 making
their allocation a very real privilege for the aspiring broadcaster.
Since the latter reasoning does not apply to cable pay-TV,84 the
rights/privileges doctrine falls with it.
3. Unique Impact
Courts have also upheld FCC regulation of broadcasters on
the ground that radio and television have a unique impact on the
listening and viewing public. This impact, said to be much
greater than that associated with other media (such as newspa-
pers or periodicals), justifies a greater degree of control.
The major decision utilizing this approach is Banzhaf v.
FCC,"5 where the court included advertising within the scope of
the fairness doctrine86 In dismissing a first amendment challenge
to this inclusion, Chief Judge Bazelon discussed the impact of
various media and distinguished radio and television:
Unlike broadcasting, the written press includes a rich variety of
outlets for expression and persuasion, including journals, pam-
phlets, leaflets and circular letters, which are available to those
without technical skills or deep pockets. Moreover, the broadcasting
medium may be different in kind from publishing in a way which
has particular relevance to the case at hand. Written messages are
not communicated unless they are read, and reading requires an
affirmative act. Broadcast messages, in contrast, are "in the air."
See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874); Barron v. Burnside.
121 U.S. 186, 200 (1887); Milwaukee Social Democratic Club Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255
U.S. 407, 437 (1921)(Holmes, J., dissenting); Terral v. Burke Construction Co.. 257 U.S.
529, 532 (1922); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 515 (1926); Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v. California R.R. Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926); United States v.
Chicago, St. Paul & Minneapolis Ry., 282 U.S. 311, 328-29 (1931); Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965).
See note 17 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
' 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Tobacco Institute v. FCC,
396 U.S. 842 (1969).
" The fairness doctrine is described briefly in note 65 supra. Banzhaf itself concerned
the right of reply by public interest groups to cigarette advertisements (replies that would
stress the health hazards posed by smoking).
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In an age of omnipresent radio, there scarcely breathes a citizen who
does not know some part of a leading cigarette jingle by heart. Simi-
larly, an ordinarily habitual television watcher can avoid these com-
mercials only by frequently leaving the room, changing the channel,
or doing some other affirmative act. It is difficult to calculate the
subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda, which may be
heard even if not listened to, but it may reasonably be thought
greater than the impact of the written word. 7
Banzhaf has not given rise to many subsequent decisions
resting on the concept of impact."' Thus there is doubt about the
continued viability of impact as a first amendment counterbal-
ance. However, assuming arguendo that the concept is still valid,
it is plainly inapplicable to cable pay-TV. The nature of the
special impact of radio and TV, as developed by Chief Judge
Bazelon, consists of three elements: (1) The greater impact of any
one channel because of the overall paucity of airspace; 9 (2) the
, 405 F.2d at 1100-01.
There are but two subsequent decisions which appear to rely on the concept of
impact. In Robinson v. American Broadcasting Companies, 441 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1971),
the court refused to enjoin broadcast announcements which stressed the harmful effects
of cigarette smoking. In concluding that such an injunction would clearly violate the first
amendment (id. at 1399), the court took notice of the differing nature of radio and televi-
sion, and traced that distinction to the idea of impact. Id. at 1398-99. In Capital Broad-
casting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub noma. Capital Broadcast-
ing Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972), the court upheld the constitu-
tionality of an outright ban of cigarette advertisements on radio and TV. The court also
relied upon impact in squaring its ruling with the first amendment. Id. at 585-86. Apart
from Robinson and Capital, the concept of impact has only appeared in the opinions of
Judge Bazelon, and only as dicta. See, e.g., Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC,
473 F.2d 16, 79 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1972);
Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring); National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1176 n.65 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting from the order vacating the previous order granting re-
hearing en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Accuracy in the Media, Inc. v. National Broad-
casting Co., Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1105 (1976); Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC,
515 F.2d 397, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Statement of Bazelon, C.J., in favor of granting
rehearing en banc).
There is also some doubt as to whether Banzhaf is traceable to previous first amend-
ment law. There is some validity in tracing the concept of impact to the dissenting opinion
of Justice Jackson in Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 308 (1951). However, the doctrine
(if it indeed may be labeled as such) is more likely a product of scholarly speculation,
transmuted by Banzhaf into the force of law. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 71, at 154-
55 (cited in Banzhaf); Note, supra note 71, at 713; Note, Memorandum on First Amend-
ment Issues Involved in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, News Directors' Association
v. United States, and Banzhaf v. FCC, 43 CONN. B.J. 517, 524 (1970).
11 "Unlike broadcasting, the written press includes a rich variety of outlets for expres-
sion .... " 405 F.2d at 1100 (emphasis supplied).
VOL. 53
FCC REGULATION OF CABLE PAY-TV
fact that television and radio are thrust upon the consumer, and
can be avoided only by affirmative action;9 and (3) the assump-
tion that television and radio have greater psychological effect
upon the public because of their numerical pervasiveness." Cable
pay-TV is not plagued by spectrum scarcity, and is but one voice
out of many available to CATV subscribers." It is not thrust upon
the consumer; indeed, obtaining any cable TV service requires
the affirmative act. 3 Finally, the differing technology of cable
pay-TV constrains its growth, and renders it far less pervasive
than radio or television."
" "Written messages are not communicated ualess they are read, and reading re-
quires an affirmative act. Broadcast messages, in contrast, are 'in the air.' " Id. (emphasis
supplied).
" "It is difficult to calculate the subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda
. ... Id. (emphasis supplied). This allusion to the numerical pervasiveness of radio and
television is further clarified in Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16,
79 n.65 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1972) (stressing
the fact that the average American household watches television an average of 6 hours
per day). See also Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 586 n.13
(D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405
U.S. 1000 (1972).
" See note 69 supra.
"' Cable pay-TV is available either on a per-program or per-channel fee basis. Those
systems operating on a per-program basis require the subscriber to purchase tickets or
other devices to activate the decoding units on their TV receivers and receive a particular
program. See, e.g., the systems described in ADLER & BAER, supra note 11, at 34. Those
systems operating on a per-channel basis require at minimum that the viewer connect his
television to a cable TV network, and lease a decoding device from the entrepreneur on a
monthly basis. All programs transmitted over that cable pay-TV channel will be received
as a matter of course. The majority of cable pay-TV systems are now operating on this
basis. See Fact Sheet, supra note 15, at 2.
" Normal broadcast television service is currently received by some 66,200,000
homes. Broadcasting: Yearbook 12 (1974). This number has risen steadily over the last
decade. Id. at 68. The average American family watches television an average of 6 hr. 52
min. per day, or 44 hr. 7 min. per week. Id. at 69.
Present penetration and future expansion of cable pay-TV is much more limited, tied
as it is to the growth of cable television proper (since CATV serves as the carrier for cable
pay-TV). At present, cable pay-TV services roughly 60,000 homes, or 1 percent of all
homes served by CATV (estimated at 7 million, Broadcasting: Cable Sourcebook 5 (1974)
The total number of homes served by cable television in turn amounts to only 9 percent
of the families served by broadcast television generally. Estimates of the future expansion
of cable pay-TV are generally couched in pessimistic terms. See, e.g., Nou., PECK &
McGOWAN, supra note 18, at 142, 149 (suggests that cable pay-TV will eventually pene-
trate only 4 percent of the homes served by CATV). But see Stanford Research Institute
Press Release, Apr. 11, 1974, at 1 (commenting on a recently concluded study which
indicates that cable pay-TV will achieve a 30 percent penetration rate by 1985, with 25
million subscribers and revenues of over $4 billion per annum).
On the issue of average family exposure, the National Association of Broadcasters
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4. Commercial Structure of Broadcast Television
The profits of the broadcast industry are obtained almost
entirely from advertising."5 Since there are few broadcast chan-
nels," advertisers who want to reach the broadest public tend to
avoid subsidizing shows which are "high brow" or controversial. 7
The need to offset the influence of a small number of large adver-
tisers is a strong argument for allowing some control by the FCC
over network programming. 8 But once again, the argument fails
when applied to cable pay-TV. Cable pay-TV is apt to be more
ecumenical in its programming than broadcast network televi-
sion. A given program need only find a small segment of the
public willing to pay for it to justify its transmission.9
indicates that cable pay-TV will be used with more discretion than broadcast television.
See National Ass'n of Broadcasters, Fact Sheet: Economic Aspects of Siphoning (1974)
at 2-3 (suggesting that the weekly median would be one 2-hour movie per family, amount-
ing to a yearly exposure of some 100+ hours of viewing).
" Total television revenues (less commissions) for fiscal 1972 amounted to
$3,179,400,000 (an increase of 15.6 percent from the previous year). FCC, Television Fin-
ancial Data, 39 FCC ANN. REP. 223 (1973). Gross advertising revenues for television
amounted to $3,675,000,000 in fiscal 1972 (also amounting to an increase of 15.6 percent
from the previous year). Id.
, See note 17 supra.
The major networks, relying on advertising revenues, are thus pressured into broad-
casting only those programs which satisfy the sponsor's interests. See, e.g., FCC, OFFICE
OF NETWORK STUDY, TELEVISION NETWORK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT, 2d Interim Report
(1965):
It is an economic fact of life that under our present system of television
broadcasting the ultimate diversity of programs . . . whatever may be the
intent and efforts of licensees, cannot be substantially greater than the sum
of the diversity of commercial interests and advertising objectives among the
sponsors for whom it is "good business" to provide economic support for
television.
Id. at 26. As an example of the control wielded by sponsors, consider the fact that over 55
percent of all television series are cancelled each year, many of which have garnered
popular praise and viewing audiences exceeding 20 million homes. See Optical Comments,
supra note 70, at 14.
The delicate symbiosis between broadcasters and advertisers is set out in detail in
Note, Diversity in Television Program Content: A Proposal for Sustaining Programming,
7 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROS. 319, 322-23 (1971).
" See, e.g., Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 n.76 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied
sub nom. Tobacco Institute v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969); Note, supra note 70, at 714. Cf.
Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy, and the First Amendment, 10 J.L. & ECON. 15, 31-
32 (1967).
"1 In other words, because it relies solely upon subscriber fees for income (rather than
advertising, which is expressly forbidden) cable pay-TV will schedule programming based
upon popular demand rather than external forces. The purchasing power of the individual
consumer, when added to that of his fellows, can ensure a program fare closer to individual
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CONCLUSION
This article has argued that the anti-siphoning rules, as ap-
plied to cable pay-TV, violate both the commands of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934, and the first amendment. The legal analy-
sis suggests that the courts should nullify these rules on appellate
review.""'
It should be noted, however, that the analysis contained
herein proceeds on classical tenets of statutory construction and
first amendment theory. A number of public policy issues, de-
cidedly non-traditional in character, have yet to be resolved.
These issues are important, because they may ultimately sup-
port the article's thesis or provide renewed impetus for anti-
siphoning controls. For example, will a viable cable pay-TV, un-
fettered by such controls, provide the solution to a growing net-
work monopolization over programming?"" Will it stimulate the
growth of cable television proper in urban areas?"0 2 Conversely,
tastes and needs. See, e.g., Minasian, Television Pricing and the Theory of Public Goods,
7 J.L. & EcoN. 71, 75 (1964).
'* The Justice Department has recently initiated a challenge to the anti-siphoning
rules in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See N.Y.
Times, Feb. 6, 1976, § 2, at 58, col. 6.
'"I By 1973, the degree of this monopolization had increased to the point where 84
percent of all prime time television was selected and prepared by the major television
networks. Long, Antitrust and the Television Networks: Restructuring Via Cable TV, 6
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 99, 102 (1973). This has evoked fears of mass "thought control"
by a small group of network executives. See, e.g., Johnson, Freedom to Create: The
Implications of Antitrust Policy for Television Programming Content, 8 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 11, 18 (1970). Advocates of cable pay-TV suggest that a fully developed medium, as
an alternative program source, will liberate the American viewer from his role as "a virtual
prisoner . . . of three giant organizations . Optical Comments, supra note 70, at
12.
102 The outstanding potential of CATV takes three primary forms: as a source of
greater program diversity; as a future vehicle for two-way "broadband" communications;
and as a technological solution to the shortcomings of traditional VHF/UHF broadcasting.
These benefits have been noted by Congress, commissions, commentators, and the courts.
See, e.g., 1969 CA TV Hearings, supra note 7, at 67 (testimony of Irving Kahn, Telepromp-
ter Corp.), 135 (testimony of Harold Wigren, Joint Council on Educational Telecommuni-
cations), and 210 (testimony of Harold Barnett, consultant, National Cable Television
Ass'n); FINAL REPORT: PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNICATIONS POLICY (1968) at ch.
7, 36-39; CABLE: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, CABINET COMM. ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 9-
16 (Office of Telecommunications Policy 1974); SLOAN REPORT, supra note 5, at chs. 6, 8,
9, and 11; Southwestern Cable Co. v. United States, 392 U.S. 157, 164 (1968); United
States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 651 (1972).
As to the relationship between these benefits, the cities, and cable pay-TV, the
following reasoning is advanced; Cable operations within major cities pose special finan-
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will a strictly regulated cable pay-TV ensure that low income
groups receive the same leisure-time options as wealthier
Americans?"'" Will it prevent inflationary and self-destructive
price wars between the media over program material?' 4 At this
time, the answers supplied are neither consistent or conclusive.
At best, they suggest the need for continued scholarly analysis,
and for continued concern by the FCC, the courts, and the
American public.
cial problems. For example, the National Association of Broadcasters has suggested that
the cost of wiring in urban households to CATV amounts to over $300 per home and over
$600 per apartment. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, Fact Sheet on Economic Aspects of
Siphoning 4 (1974). The Justice Department has voiced fears that a restricted cable pay-
TV capacity (i.e., by virtue of anti-siphoning rules) would inhibit already cautious CATV
operators from entering urban areas, where cable has yet to take hold. Optical Comments,
supra note 70, at 19-21. Cable pay-TV could, it is claimed, provide CATV proper with
enough additional revenues to maintain inner-city operations on a continued basis. First
Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 15, reconsideration denied, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 797 (1975).
1 Opponents of cable pay-TV suggest that without the check imposed by the anti-
siphoning rules, 20 percent of the consumer units at the bottom of the income ladder would
be deprived of over 80 programs per year. These programs would be withdrawn from free
television and sold to cable pay-TV producers (because of the latter's alleged financial
power). They would cost the average viewer $134 per year, and would be unobtainable by
lower-income Americans (whose total annual recreation budget amounts to $84 and is
subject to other demands quite apart from television). National Ass'n of Broadcasters,
Fact Sheet on the Potential Impact of Pay Television upon Low Income Consumers (1974).
"I The price war has perhaps already begun. See, e.g., Paul Kagan Pay TV Newslet-
ter Commentary, July 30, 1974. The author recounts the record-breaking deal between
NBC Television and Paramount Pictures for the exclusive rights to The Godfather. The
price tag amounted to over $10 million, a far cry from the older average of $750-800
thousand per film, and even from recent "blockbusters" such as The Poseidon Adventure,
which cost ABC Television an estimated $3.3 million. See also First Report & Order, 52
F.C.C.2d 1, 17, reconsideration denied, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 797
(1975).
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